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Abstract 
In the UK, copyright law provides a property right to authors for works that meet certain 
criteria. Contracts can be used to help a right holder exploit that property right. Copyright has 
been alleged to provide a balance between the interests of right holders and other stake 
holders. Whilst there is much debate as to what that balance is, there is evidence that the use 
of contracts could nonetheless be affecting it. Contracts can be used in a way that extends or 
restricts protection that would otherwise exist under Copyright law. Legal rules regulate the 
extent to which this is permitted, but this varies between the UK, EU and the US. In the UK and 
EU the function of copyright remains vulnerable to an imbalance introduced by contracts. A 
test adapted from an overruled US case could resolve that imbalance.  
Introduction 
Whilst debates are ongoing as to what the copyright balance is and whether a balance has been 
achieved,1 it cannot be denied that copyright law provides legal protection for works that might 
otherwise be reproduced without the threat of legal sanction. In order to exploit the copyright 
that is granted by law, right holders will often use contracts in both the creation and distribution 
of a copyright work. Contracts influence the copyright balance in a number of ways, affecting the 
authorial process and the relationship between authors, publishers and the public. It is usual for 
authors to transfer their copyright interests to publishers using contracts. Contracts can also be 
used to provide permission to recipients to perform acts that would otherwise be an 
infringement of copyright. However, contracts can be used to restrict what content recipients do 
with the right holder’s work. This may involve copyright style protections. However, a contract 
only binds those who are a party to the contract, whereas a copyright binds the entire world. 
Nonetheless, in the digital context, in many situations contracts which contain copyright style 
clauses have to be agreed to in order to access the original work. The distinction between 
contracts and copyright, in the sense that a contract is between individuals and copyright against 
the world, is breaking down. This has meant that contractual clauses which extend copyright 
protection can undermine the balance within copyright law. 
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The increased use of copyright style contractual clauses in the digital context is an issue which 
UK and EU law has insufficiently dealt with. The CDPA 1988 only provides a piecemeal legislative 
response to the challenge that such contracts pose. The accusation that the law has insufficiently 
dealt with the challenge that contractual clauses may provide to the copyright balance may also 
be levelled at the US, however, in the US there is at least a line of overruled case law which 
could restore the copyright balance. That line of case law argues that whenever contracts are 
within “the general subject matter” of copyright law, then they should be subject to the 
copyright balancing exercise. 2 If that test were implemented in to UK and EU law, it would 
provide a platform by which courts could analyse the impact of copyright style contractual 
clauses on the copyright balance. 
Contracts & the Copyright Balance. 
Contracts have been used in a way which influences the copyright balancing exercise. This is 
particularly so where contracts give protection for works protected by copyright which is 
broader than that granted by legislation. For instance, a clause in a contract could seek to extend 
the period of duration of protection of a work from that provided by legislation – 70 years from 
the death of the author – to any period beyond that, potentially into perpetuity. Equally, a 
contractual clause might seek to broaden the protection granted by the legislation in relation to 
reproduction of a work protected by copyright. Insufficiently original information might not be 
protected under copyright law, but a contractual clause may state that the information is not to 
be reproduced. There is a piecemeal approach that has been taken in UK and EU copyright law  
to the regulation of this situation. For instance, a contractual clause cannot be enforced if it 
prohibits decompilation of computer software.3 However, beyond these few examples there is 
no explicit policy dealing with contracts and contractual terms that seek to extend copyright 
protection beyond that laid down in the legislation.   
 
In the digital environment contracts are increasingly used by copyright owners to control the use 
of their works on-line.  Many of these seek to exert broader, stronger and longer control over 
protected works than would be available either in the analogue world, or in the legislation.  It 
seems therefore essential that a common approach is adopted by regulators and policy makers 
to these practices.   After all, law, with all the compromises, checks and balances that entails, is 
made by regulators and not by copyright owners seeking to (over-enforce) their intellectual 
property.    
 
In contrast to the UK and EU, in the US there is a line of case law which provides controls over 
the use of such contracts and contract terms. The test that has been formulated states that 
whenever contracts are within “the general subject matter” of copyright law, then they should 
be subject to the copyright balancing exercise.4 If ”the general subject matter” test were 
adopted in UK and EU law, then this would mean that the copyright balance would remain a 
fundamental element in the protection of creative works.   This naturally raises the question of 
what the copyright balance actually is. As implemented by statute, copyright law provides a 
property right against the world.5 In order for a work to be eligible for copyright protection 
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certain requirements must be met, and these include being within certain statutory categories,6 
having sufficient originality,7 being in material form,8 having a link to the country concerned9 and 
to not be excluded on the grounds of public policy.10 If these requirements are met, then the 
owner of the copyright work will be able to exercise exclusive rights such as reproduction, 
adaptation and communication, and be able to authorise others to perform these acts.11 When 
these rights are interpreted by the courts they regularly refer to the notion of the “copyright 
balance” between creators of content and their recipients. For instance, the copyright balance 
was described in 1785 by Lord Mansfield in Sayre v Moore:12  
“we must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the 
one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of 
the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of 
their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of 
improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.”13 
In the UK, that sentiment has been present in numerous cases up to the present day. For 
example, judgments in seminal UK copyright cases such as Designers Guild14 and the Da Vinci 
Code case15  have balanced the breadth of protection against the ability of recipients to re-use 
elements of the work. Those cases focused upon the degree to which ideas could be re-used in 
subsequent works.16 In early US law, the focus was often on the balance between the author, 
the promotion of learning, to prevent monopoly or to provide order in the book trade by 
Government grant,17 but the recent trend has been to cite or follow Sayre.18 The notion of the 
copyright balance is perhaps best considered as a judicial tool by which competing interests can 
be assessed within the confines of copyright law. For instance, the copyright balance was 
invoked by the US Supreme Court in order to justify the introduction of the test of inducement 
from patent law into copyright law.19 
In contrast to copyright, contracts contain the details of agreements between legal entities or 
individuals. Unlike copyright, they have an in personam character, which means that they cannot 
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be enforced against the world but only against the parties to the contract.  Contracts that 
involve copyright works rely on the protection provided by copyright law in order to make these 
works a valuable, exploitable commodity. For instance, copyright may protect the first sale and 
reproduction of a literary work, but contract can then also govern in more detail how and where 
the work is first sold, or to what extent reproduction of the work is authorised. If this were not 
so it would not be possible for licensees to regulate the use of copyright content. For instance, a 
licensed user of Windows would potentially be in breach of the right of reproduction when the 
software is installed on a computer were it not for the licence. However, contracts may go 
further than simply permitting an act that would otherwise be an infringement of copyright. A 
contractual clause may prohibit a subsequent recipient of copyright content from exercising 
their rights in copyright. Furthermore, contracts can govern works that are both protected and 
not protected by copyright. A contractual clause could, for instance, prohibit the reproduction of 
a non copyrightable element in a copyright work, such as an insufficiently original fact. This 
would be an extension of copyright style protection. It is also arguable that this may even 
preclude copyright law if the majority of uses have to agree to the contract in order to access 
the work. These scenarios will now be examined in turn. 
An example of where a contract expressly prevents future recipients using copyright law to 
regulate subsequent re-uses of a work is ‘free software.’ ‘Free software’ is software that is 
governed by a contract which states that software should not be encoded to prevent individuals 
from accessing the underlying computer code. GNU/Linux, an Operating System based upon 
Unix, has a contract which regulates re-use known as the GNU GPL (the “GNU’s Not Unix” 
General Public Licence). The GNU GPL incorporates a concept described by founder Richard 
Stallman as “copyleft.” In his words, the “central idea of copyleft is that we [the coders] give 
everyone permission to run the program, copy the program, modify the program, and distribute 
modified versions – but not permission to add restrictions of their own.”20 Each subsequent 
work must therefore not constrain particular re-uses. If a subsequent owner of code does so, 
then they can be liable for a breach of contract.21 The breach of contract will occur regardless of 
whether copyright covers the software. Furthermore, a breach can still occur even if copyright 
grants to a right holder rights over inter alia reproduction and communication to the public. A 
right holder cannot exercise the right over reproduction if it is in breach of the contract. Due to 
the binding nature of the GNU GPL over subsequent content, it is arguable that this upsets the 
copyright balance.  
Contracts can regulate re-use not just where there is a contract not to exploit a copyright, but 
also where the contract extends copyright style protection beyond that normally permitted by 
copyright law. An example of a contract such as this is the Microsoft EULA (End User License 
Agreement) that is provided with Microsoft Windows XP. Users are deemed to acknowledge 
acceptance of the contract terms often on the opening of the shrink wrap packaging, or by 
clicking “I agree” to the EULA on the computer. This will occur with any legitimate copies of 
Windows XP. According to the EULA, a ‘transfer’ of a copy of Windows XP will be permitted 
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under the licence only once.22 This is different to copyright law where if a work is sold, then 
there can be no further control by the right holder over the distribution of the work.23 This is 
because the right of distribution is exhausted after first sale. Whenever a user installs an original 
copy of Windows XP, they need to agree to the EULA if they are to be able to activate the 
software. In practice, this license therefore affects the copyright balance in relation to the 
distribution right because the contract applies to all authorised copies of Windows XP that 
contain the EULA. Contractual clauses that extend copyright style protection may also affect the 
copyright balance. 
Contracts can go beyond extending the rights of copyright. They have even been held to 
preclude copyright law. In this situation, copyright style protection may be provided through a 
contractual clause even though copyright protection has been explicitly denied by either statute 
or by a court. This situation occurred in the US case of Pro CD v Zeidenberg in the Seventh 
Circuit.24 A telephone directory, of the sort which had been denied protection in Feist,25 was 
given copyright style protection by a contract. The contract differentiated in prices between 
different types of consumers. Zeidenberg took data that was only protected by contract and not 
by copyright law, and redistributed this at a lower price. Despite the lack of copyright protection, 
the Seventh Circuit upheld the contract.26 Increasingly in the online context, users have to agree 
to such contracts whenever they access information.27 As with the Windows XP EULA, the in 
personam and in rem distinction between copyright and contract is breaking down, because the 
contract will apply to the majority, if not all, those who legitimately access the content. When a 
contract such as that in Pro CD provides copyright style protection, it therefore has clear 
potential to undermine the copyright balance.  
It is therefore possible to identify three types of contractual clauses that regulate copyright 
works – those that inhibit future copyright holders from exploiting their rights, those contracts 
that extend copyright style controls into new areas, and those contracts that exclude copyright 
style controls contrary to the rules found in copyright law. All three have the potential to 
undermine the balance between authors and re-users that is found within copyright law. 
Copyright law grants rights to right holders that can be exploited in particular circumstances, and 
subject to certain defences. These three types of contractual clauses affect the ability of right 
holders to exploit their copyright, for contracts can require both wider and narrower degrees of 
exploitation. Copyright law has dealt with these different types of contract in different ways. 
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The UK 
In the UK, where the law has been amended as a consequence of domestic implementation of 
EU Directives,28 the main focus has been on contracts which restrict specific acts not covered by 
copyright. According to the preambles of the Directives, this was necessary to maintain the 
copyright balance. However, outside of specific circumstances there is no broad approach in 
relation to contracts that could extend the copyright style protection. In contrast to this, in the 
US, the focus has been establishing a broad approach to contracts which not only restrict the 
exploitation of copyright, but also those which extend existing copyright and those which create 
new copyright style rights in direct disregard of copyright law.   
In the UK, the only statutory provision which governs the relationship between contracts and 
copyright is to be found in the Fair Dealing chapter. The Fair Dealing provisions are statutory 
sections which detail various “permitted acts” of infringement, and according to s.28(1):  
“..[the provisions] relate only to the question of infringement of copyright and 
do not affect any other right or obligation restricting the doing of any of the 
specified acts.”29  
An act that would otherwise be permitted by copyright law can therefore be restricted by 
contract. However, the provision only applies where there is existing copyright protection; it 
cannot be used to extend copyright protection and so only applies to the former situation. By 
way of comparison, if a contractual clause states that it is not permissible to make a copy of a 
book supplied to a public library, but a copy is nonetheless made, there will still be a breach of 
contract. However, if a contractual clause extends the period of duration of copyright protection 
to 200 years, then this will not be covered by s.28(1). Increasingly, contracts are extending 
protection over areas not covered by copyright. Furthermore, the increasing use of licenses on 
the Internet and in digital works has meant that it is more likely that content recipients will be 
bound by a copyright style contractual clause. For instance, a library could sign up to a database 
of e-books, but a contractual clause in the access agreement could forbid reproduction of any 
kind of the e-book, whether to make a private copy of for the purpose of research. This access 
agreement could bind all users who legitimately access the work. 
The growth in the use of contracts which bind all those who access the software has the 
potential to upset the copyright balance. Use of such contracts will limit the application of the 
Fair Dealing provisions and consequently the possibility of a user being able to argue that a 
particular use is one that is a “permitted act” under the Statute. This situation was not unique to 
the UK, and so in the 2001 Information Society Directive30 the EU introduced a number of 
provisions which Member States could implement which would maintain the copyright balance 
in relation to certain acts. The EU has chosen to focus on areas specific to the digital domain, 
                                                          
28
 For example, Directive 91/250 of the Council of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer 
programs OJ L 122/42 and Directive 2001/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 
OJ L 167/10 (hereafter ‘EUCD’). 
29
 s.28(1) CDPA 1988. 
30
 Directive 2001/29 supra 28. Implemented in the UK by SI 2003/2498 Copyright and Related Rights 
Regulations 2003. 
rather than ones which will cover both analogue and digital works. As a result, the CDPA 1988 
now requires that where a person uses a computer program under an agreement, any term or 
condition in the agreement shall be void if it prohibits or restricts a) the right to make necessary 
back-up copies, b) the right to decompile a program or the use of any device or method to 
analyse the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program or is c) for the 
purposes of lawful use, the copying or adapting of a computer program or d) a lawful use 
prevented by a contract enforced by DRM. 
The narrow scope of these provisions immediately reveals that they do not seek to provide a 
broad brush approach to maintaining the traditional copyright balance into the digital sphere. 
They are for certain acts in specific situations. The broader issue of the increasing use of click 
wrap and shrink wrap licenses in the digital era has been sidestepped. Nonetheless, due to the 
nature of the digital environment, there is the potential for these specific provisions to be of 
wider ranging application. A requirement, for instance, that back up copies be permissible could 
result in unencrypted versions becoming available, which in turn could reduce the use of 
encryption to protect ideas and concepts that copyright law would otherwise allow to be 
reproduced and adapted. Indeed, if a contractual clause seeks to bind a party to the contract 
from making a back up reproduction of a copyright work for a “lawful use,” then this will be held 
void under s.50A of the CDPA 1988, as introduced by the amending Regulations which 
implemented the 2001 Information Society Directive. The wording of s.50A is as follows: 
“ (1)It is not an infringement of copyright for a lawful user of a copy of a 
computer program to make any back up copy of it which it is necessary for him 
to have for the purposes of his lawful use. 
.. 
(3)Where an act is permitted under this section, it is irrelevant whether or not 
there exists any term or condition in an agreement which purports to prohibit 
or restrict the act (such terms being, by virtue of section 296A, void.”31 
There are two key variables in s50A that require clarification. The first concerns what is meant by 
“lawful use.” That has been taken to refer to uses which would be “permitted acts” – in other 
words, the provisions to be found within the Fair Dealing chapter within the CDPA.32 However, 
the second variable  - that the back up be “necessary” – has been interpreted in a particularly 
restrictive fashion. For instance, making a back up copy of a CD-ROM might be considered 
“necessary” by a user due to the possibility of damage to the original disk. However, the UK 
judiciary has taken a particularly narrow approach to the definition of the term. Back up copies 
are not deemed to be “necessary” in most situations. In Sony v Owen,33 Justice Jacob said that 
the making of back up copies of software on CD-ROMS was not something that was “necessary.” 
This was because the CD-ROM is sold as a unit: “The fact is that if you spoil your CD, which has a 
recording of music on it, you have to go and buy another. The same is true of a CD carrying a 
game. Backups are not necessary at all.”34 This is a particularly restrictive interpretation which 
will considerably limit the scope of the provision. The interpretation suggests that a back up 
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copy for the purpose of, for instance, reverse engineering will not be permissible. It makes the 
provision appear to be more relevant to data systems that have only one unique copy of the 
stored data, where the loss of one copy of the data will result in that data being unobtainable 
from any other source. Furthermore, in light of Justice Jacob’s interpretation, it appears that the 
court would be willing to accept that a licence to use a work would merely be a licence, and that 
making a back up copy could be a breach of that licence in most, if not all, circumstances. This is 
because it would probably be possible to sign a new licence agreement. Consequently, the scope 
of s.50A has been considerably limited. Its use in relation to back up copies is only for very 
limited circumstances, much more limited than those found within the Fair Dealing chapter of 
the CDPA. A wide reading of s.50A could allow back up copies for any  purpose so long as it is 
“necessary,” or alternately it could be read slightly more narrowly to merely enable or perhaps 
guarantee particular acts beyond that in Sony. However, both readings are not permitted under 
Justice Jacob’s interpretation of s.50A. 
In relation to the provision that concerns decompilation, there is similarly a restrictive 
interpretation. Decompilation describes the process whereby code of low level abstraction is 
turned into a higher level of abstraction, in order to make it readable for humans. Decompilation 
is not an infringement of UK copyright under s.50B CDPA 1988 if necessary for program to 
program interoperability. The information obtained is also only to be used for that purpose.35 
This is particularly restrictive (and potentially arbitrarily so) because program to program 
interoperability only covers situations where programs need to ‘talk’ to each other, as opposed 
to the more common situation where hardware needs to converse with a program.  To add to 
this restrictive application, s.50B also states that decompilation is not permitted if the content 
recipient “uses the information to create a program which is substantially similar in its 
expression to the program decompiled or to do any act restricted by copyright.”36 As Copinger 
and Skone James have noted, that is likely to be a reference to where there is reproduction of a 
substantial part.37 This means that if program to program interoperability is sought in order to 
change the way in which a computer program operates, it must do so only by directly altering 
the program and not by replacing components of that software – to do that would be an 
infringement of copyright.  This restricts the application of the provision considerably because in 
many situations interoperability does require reproduction of (often) large parts of an existing 
programme and it is therefore quite possible that there will be reproduction of a substantial part 
under cases such as Designers Guild.38 Consequently, the provision is a narrow one, and 
therefore is of limited application to the broader copyright balancing exercise. 
Another limit to the enforceability of contractual clauses which affect the copyright balance is in 
relation to the copying or adaptation of computer programs for lawful uses, as laid down in 
s.50C(1)(a). 39  As Atkins has noted, “it is fundamental to remember that for a user to be able to 
make any changes to a program, in this instance to correct errors, depends on whether or not 
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they have access to the program source code. Yet, the legislation does not prescribe that the 
supplier should supply the source code for error correction purposes...”40  The provision is 
therefore limited in terms of its reach, because coders of computer programs will rarely provide 
the source code with their products.  
The EU revisions to the CDPA that will void contractual clauses in certain circumstances 
therefore have limited application due partly to judicial interpretation, and partly due to the 
narrowness of the legislative provisions themselves. However, whilst the s.50 provisions are 
ones that deal relatively specifically with contractual clauses, they are not the only ones that 
have an impact on the enforceability of such clauses. There are further statutory provisions, 
which also arise from an EU Directive and are implemented by changes to the CDPA. These are 
the provisions that deal with Digital Rights Management (DRM) mechanisms. 
DRM mechanisms are typically pieces of software or hardware that control access to content 
that is stored on the computer. They will often be enforcing license agreements between a 
copyright holder and the recipient of the content.  For instance, on i-Tunes DRM known as “Fair 
Play” was used to enforce the Apple i-Tunes EULA which stated that users could make up to 
seven copies of each piece of music downloaded from its online store. However, a DRM 
mechanism itself can behave similarly to a contract, in that it does not require a EULA to be 
effective. A purchaser of a DVD does not sign an agreement not to reproduce the DVD – the 
reproduction is prevented by the use of the DRM mechanism known as the Content Scrambling 
System (CSS). Importantly, this style of contractual regulation has no regard to the notion of 
copyright. The “rights” element of Digital “Rights” Management refers to the right to access any 
information on the computer, whether it is copyrighted or not. The use of the word “right” is not 
a reference to “copyright.” In the same manner as contractual clauses which extend copyright 
protection over elements of a work that either does not have copyright, or extends the duration 
of existing protection, a DRM mechanism can extend copyright style controls over non copyright 
works and non copyright elements. However, the manner in which this is regulated is different 
to the approach taken by the CPDA to specific contractual clauses. 
In relation to DRM, the CDPA was amended by the Information Society Directive 2001. Unlike 
the specific provisions dealing with contractual clauses, the approach of the Directive was to 
take, what appears on first glance, to be a broad brush approach. The Directive required that 
right holders and users should attempt to come to a “voluntary agreement” if measures were in 
place that would prevent a use that would otherwise be permitted under the exceptions.41 A list 
of the implemented exceptions is provided in Schedule 5A of the CDPA, and this broadly reflects 
the list of Fair Dealing provisions. However, there have been significant issues in relation to its 
implementation which has rendered the provision of limited, if any, use. In the UK the provision 
was implemented through s.296ZE.  If it is not possible for a user of a protected work to be able 
to reach a “voluntary agreement” with a right holder, then the user is supposed to be able to 
have recourse to the Secretary of State to force the right holder to grant access. In the UK this 
has been problematic. Although s.296ZE states that there should be a recourse of appeal to the 
Secretary of State – and this can be achieved through filling in a form on the Internet – the 
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Gowers Review noted that few people have made use of this procedure.42 The interface 
between DRMs enforcement of contracts, DRM mechanisms themselves, and copyright law is 
therefore heavily influenced by the initial efficacy of the DRM mechanism in question. As 
outlined earlier, this is important because works on the Internet are often accessed under a 
DRM contractual licence rather than by sale of the work.43 The mass selling computer game Half 
Life 244 was only playable once the player was logged in on a program called Steam.45 Access can 
be terminated at any time, e.g. if contractual terms regarding re-use are broken. If the contract 
prohibits reproduction of a non copyright element of a work, then the user may lose access to 
the work for reproducing something that is not protected by copyright law. Similarly, access 
could be withdrawn if the contract forbids certain alteration of the work,46 even though the 
work in question is a copyright work, and the only way to access it is through an access 
mechanism. Thus again copyright law has failed to grasp the full impact of contracts upon the 
balancing exercise.  
There is, however, a nascent broad approach that has developed within the ‘Restraint of Trade’ 
doctrine. The doctrine has arisen through case law, and it is not present within the CDPA. It has 
been applied by judges when considering exclusive licence agreements between right holders 
and authors. For instance, a music distributor may sign an exclusive licence agreement with a 
musician; those agreements may be covered by the doctrine. However, the doctrine will only 
apply in very specific, defined circumstances. Lord Reid in Macaulay v Schroeder47 stated that if 
“… contractual restrictions appear to be unnecessary or to be reasonably capable of an 
enforcement in an oppressive manner they must be justified before they can be enforced.”48 
Humphries J in Silvertone Records,49 following an extract of Lord Reid’s comments in Macaulay 
and discussion of the plaintiff’s submissions, argued that: 
“It may be permissible for a short time to absorb the output of the party or to 
prevent the party using its output other than strictly within the terms of the 
contract. But if an artist is effectively able to be prevented from reaching the 
public over a prolonged period I find it unrealistic to say that this is not a 
contract in restraint of trade.”50 
However, whilst the doctrine implies that a contract may restrict the dissemination of the output 
of a creator, it does not draw a clear parallel or link through to the copyright balancing exercise. 
The judgments could have drawn a clear link through to the copyright balancing exercise, but 
they do not do so. The emphasis in Macaulay is instead on the issue of oppressiveness; in 
Silvertone, it is the underlying concern of oppressiveness combined with the issue of 
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dissemination. The doctrine does not provide any specific guidance in case law as to the manner 
in which the copyright balancing exercise may or may not be affected, but it does at least 
demonstrate that the courts are willing limit such contracts on broad policy grounds. 
A similar situation can be found at the EU level. Under EU law, the equivalent doctrine is that of 
“essential facilities.” It is also a court based doctrine, though in this instance the doctrine may be 
applied where there “is something owned or controlled by a dominant undertaking to which 
other undertakings need access in order to provide products or services to customers.”51 
Following the Microsoft52 case, an ‘essential facility’ could be part of something protected by 
copyright. Microsoft, in developing Windows XP, had developed a set of Application Program 
Interfaces (APIs) which allowed programs to easily ‘plug’ themselves into Windows. However, 
due to the design of the APIs only software coders who had an agreement with Microsoft could 
make use of these APIs. The European Commission initiated a competition investigation into the 
practice and ordered that Microsoft make their APIs more accessible.53 The ECJ affirmed this 
decision.54 The outcome of the case is that if an “essential facility” within a copyright work such 
as software is not accessible to others, then this will be contrary to competition law. As with the 
restraint of trade doctrine, the main focus is not whether the copyright balance is upset, but 
instead principles relating to fair competition.  
In sum, the approach of the UK is to permit contractual clauses that restrict the enforcement of 
copyright, but that there is a piecemeal approach towards where contractual clauses extend 
existing copyright law. In certain particular situations, such clauses will be held void. Whilst 
contractual clauses that extend copyright style protection may be subject to broader balancing 
exercises in relation to restraint of trade and competition law, these balancing exercises do not 
specifically address the relationship between contracts and the copyright balance. With the 
growth in the distribution of digital works that are regulated by contract, it is increasingly 
important that a broader policy is developed. This is especially so where contractual clauses 
provide for copyright style protection over works that are not covered by copyright. Unlike the 
UK, there is such an approach in the US within case law.  
 The US approach 
In the US, the focus of the law has been on the manner in which contractual clauses may extend 
the scope of copyright style protection. Unlike the UK, the focus is not on specific areas such as 
the making of back up copies. A line of US decisions focus dealing with non copyright works 
focus on the fundamental relationship between the reach of a contract and the copyright 
balancing exercise, which is patently not the case in the UK or EU. The line of case law in 
question concerns two hearings involving a company called Pro CD.  
Pro CD used contractual clauses to prohibit their customers from reselling ProCD’s own 
compilation of telephone numbers. Traditionally, such compilations would have had protection 
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under US copyright law because of the “sweat of the brow”55  by the company in compiling the 
telephone numbers. However, following Feist56, the “sweat of the brow” test was overruled and 
such compilations lost copyright protection. ProCD therefore used a contractual clause to 
provide copyright style protection. The clause was contained in a shrink wrap licence, to which 
users had to agree in order to access the compilation data. The case was heard before both the 
Western District of Wisconsin, 57 and on appeal, the Seventh Circuit. 58 Both courts took a broad 
approach in establishing a policy towards contractual clauses which extend copyright style 
protection over potentially copyright works. In the Western District of Wisconsin it was decided 
that contractual clauses could not be used to provide copyright style protection where copyright 
itself would not provide protection. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion, due to copyright being a property right, and contract being a personal right. 
However, to reiterate the above point, both courts drew up a policy towards contractual clauses 
that extend copyright style protection and that seek to preclude copyright law. 
In holding that the contract could not be used to protect content that would otherwise not be 
protected by copyright law, the Western District of Wisconsin utilised rules relating to the 
relationship between federal and state law. Chief Justice Crabb discussed §301,59 which states 
that Federal copyright law will be supreme when state law conflicts with that Federal law. The 
Chief Justice submitted that when a work is within the “general subject matter”60 of copyright, 
then that would be sufficient to invoke §301. He also held that this would be so whether or not 
the works “qualify for protection.”61 That analysis allowed Chief Justice Crabb to argue that in 
this case, because of Feist,62 to allow for protection could affect the “delicate balancing” of 
copyright law. He stated that “Contracts that seek to protect reproduction and distribution rights 
step into territory already covered by copyright law. It would alter the ‘delicate balance’ of 
copyright law to allow parties to avoid copyright law by contracting around it.”63 The “delicate 
balance” to which he refers is that which is determined by Federal law, which relates to a 
balance of a number of interests, which includes those of right holders, content recipients, and 
broader policy issues. However, this case goes further than that, because the Chief Justice makes 
some comments about when this copyright balance is being affected by a contractual clause for 
he stated that the copyright balance should only be safeguarded when “a contract erects a 
barrier on access to information that under copyright law should be accessible.”64 It is in relation 
to this latter point that a difference between contract and copyright needs to be raised, for it is 
the point on which the Chief Justice’s judgment was to be reversed on appeal. Copyright is a 
right in rem, which binds the whole world. Contractual clauses, however, only bind the parties to 
the contract. If an individual, who was not a party to the contract, were to reproduce ProCD’s 
compilation of phone numbers, then there would be no recourse in contract by ProCD against 
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them. It was for this reason that, on appeal, Judge Easterbrook argued that rights created by 
contract were not “equivalent”65 to rights created by copyright. For him, copyright law created a 
property right against the world, whereas contracts are used by individuals in order to utilise 
that property against other individuals. As he argued: 
“A copyright is a right against the world.   Contracts, by contrast, generally affect 
only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create 
‘exclusive rights.’   Someone who found a copy of SelectPhone (trademark) on 
the street would not be affected by the shrinkwrap license-- though the federal 
copyright laws of their own force would limit the finder's ability to copy or 
transmit the application program.”66 
The facts of ProCD were important in reaching this conclusion. The information in question – the 
telephone numbers – could easily be transmitted to others, and so once a contract had been 
breached the information will be readily accessible to other individuals without those individuals 
being at risk of infringement of a contractual clause. This distinction makes the reasoning of 
Judge Easterbook to appear to have a sound logical basis. However, in the online environment, it 
is increasingly the case that works that are within the scope of copyright are being regulated 
through the use of contractual clauses that provide copyright style protection. The works in 
question are not always of a character that they can be easily reproduced. A work may be only 
accessible through an online gateway – as is the case, for instance, with online games or with 
other services that require online functionality. In this common factual scenario, the use of 
copyright style contractual clauses has a greater impact because the in rem – in personam 
distinction is of less importance, because the information has to accessed on an in personam 
basis. 
There is historical precedent for acknowledging that contractual clauses can upset the copyright 
balance where the majority of access to information is on an in personam basis. In Bobbs-Merrill 
Company v Strauss67 of 1908, the Supreme Court identified some of the ideology within 
copyright law as containing in rem principles which could not be overridden by in personam 
contractual clauses. Bobbs-Merrill had attempted to use a contractual clause for every new sale 
of its books which would prevent any application of certain in rem copyright. The defendant was 
a third party book seller who had obtained the books in question from a wholesaler, and that 
wholesaler had obtained the books from Bobbs-Merrill. The case involved consideration of the 
first sale doctrine.68 The doctrine revolves around the exhaustion of rights – the notion that once 
a work is distributed, the right holder cannot then control the subsequent sale of the work. The 
contractual clause in question was on the copyright notice page of a book. That clause stated: 
“The price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it 
at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of 
copyright.”69 
                                                          
65
 ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg supra 24 at 1454. 
66
 ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg ibid., at 1454. 
67
 Bobbs-Merrill Company v Straus (Supreme Court, 1908) supra 23. 
68
 17 USC §109(a). 
69
 Bobbs-Merrill Company v Straus (Supreme Court, 1908) supra 23 at 341. 
In that case, Justice Day argued that copyright did not impose such a right, and wrote that “In 
our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright in his right to 
multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed 
in this case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with 
whom there is no privity of contract.”70 The contract in Bobbs Merill therefore was strictly 
construed as only affecting the original parties to the contract and not subsequent purchasers. 
To translate this to the ProCD situation, the contract could not be used to extend protection 
over those who subsequently access information obtained in breach of contract. This is 
consistent with both the District of Wisconsin and the Seventh Circuit. However, Bobbs Merill is 
less clear where there is privity of contract, but where there is not copyright protection – for 
example, where an idea in a copyright work is protected by a license but not by copyright. One 
the one hand, it could be suggested that if there is deemed to be privity of contract, then the 
clause will always take effect. On the other, it could be suggested that there is a limit to 
extending copyright protection. However, the Supreme Court makes clear that it has reached its 
conclusion in “..view of the language of the statute, read in the light of its main purpose to 
secure the right of multiplying copies of the work,-a right which is the special creation of the 
statute.”71 The judgment thereafter emphasises the purpose of the copyright statute, and this 
relates back to the balancing exercise. It is therefore suggested that rather than the issue of 
privity of contact, the key issue is whether the balancing exercise in copyright law is being 
affected.  
In contrast to the UK, the US therefore has a number of rules dealing with the situation where a 
contractual clause has extended copyright style protection over a work denied copyright 
protection. It is suggested that the approach of the Western District of Wisconsin is most 
appropriate in the digital era, and that it is also more in line with historical precedent. In the UK, 
it is suggested that the same rule should be used as that proposed by Chief Justice Crabb– 
namely, that so long as a work is within the “general subject matter” of copyright, the copyright 
balancing exercise will apply.72 This raises a question as to the actual scope of the “general 
subject matter” test. The elementary view would be that the test should be implemented 
whenever copyright is involved in a given case. However, in ProCD, the work itself was not 
copyrightable. There is no clear cut guidance on this in ProCD. However, the following was 
stated in by Circuit Judge Crabb: 
“The law in this circuit is that the “subject matter of copyright” includes works 
that fit within the general subject matter of §§ 102 and 103, whether or not the 
works qualify for actual protection.”73 
The law to which Crabb refers is that which governs the relationship between federal and state 
copyright law. Nevertheless, the case law remains unclear as to where the precise boundaries 
lie. However, a common theme is that a point of law pertaining to copyright has been argued in 
                                                          
70
 Bobbs-Merrill Company v Straus ibid., at 350. 
71
 Bobbs-Merrill Company v Straus ibid., at 350-351. 
72
 ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg, (WD Wis. 1996) supra 2 at 656 and ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg, (7
th
 Circuit, 
1996) supra 25 at 1453. 
73
 ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg, (WD Wis. 1996) ibid., 656 
relation to copyright subsistence.74 It is therefore suggested that if a point of copyright law is 
arguable before a court, then for the purposes of the proposed system it would be this that 
would bring the case within the purview of the “general subject matter” test.  
How would the proposed system work in practice? 
The Pro CD cases provide a good case study of how the proposed “general subject matter” of 
copyright test would work. The Pro CD case has already been discussed above, particularly in 
relation to the test used by Chief Justice Crabb. To recall, the work in question was a digitised 
compilation of telephone numbers, and was not per se capable of copyright protection. 
However, Chief Justice Crabb argued that the work was within the scope of copyright 
protection, and so consequently it was within the scope of the copyright balance. To quote the 
words of the Chief Justice: 
“The telephone listings on the Select Phone ™ CD-ROM discs are a compilation 
of facts that would qualify for protection under §103 if they were sufficiently 
original; that they lack originality does not affect their status as coming within 
the subject matter of copyright”75 
As confirmed by Chief Justice Crabb, any work that could be argued before court as being 
capable of coming within the categories of copyright in §102 will be within the “subject matter” 
of copyright – such as literary, musical and dramatic works. To apply this test across the broad 
range of works would require consideration of the copyright balance in relation to many licences 
and copyrights that concern potentially copyrightable works: particularly shrink wrap and click 
wrap agreements of the sort found on software, for instance, Microsoft’s End User Licence 
Agreement (EULA).  
Whilst the “general subject matter” test has only been applied in the US, in the UK such a test 
could by applied without much difficulty. In the UK s1(1) CDPA 1988 is a provision similar to 
§102. It has already been noted that in the UK a contract could be used to permit certain acts 
that would otherwise be an infringement of copyright. It was also noted that contracts could 
exclude some of Fair Dealing provisions contained within the CDPA.76 The proposed test of 
“general subject matter” would require that any such contract be brought within the copyright 
balancing exercise. Such defences could not be opted out of through the use of contracts. Right 
holders who currently restrict Fair Dealing through the use of contractual clauses (e.g. as in the 
Microsoft EULA) will in all likelihood not welcome such a change to the law which will restrict 
their bargaining powers. Nonetheless, it is suggested that this is an acceptable position. 
Increasingly, with the use of technology, there are contractual provisions which govern access 
to, and the use of, copyright works.77 The rise of technology such as video streaming and pay per 
play for computer games means that in certain situations licensing is the preferred method of 
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legal regulation. The proposed changes to the law redress that change in distribution methods in 
order to ensure that the copyright balance is applied to copyright works distributed in this 
manner. Authors will often re-use existing works in later works, and contracts may govern this 
re-use.  
In relation to the “general subject matter” test at an international level, it is suggested that any 
amendments to UK, EU or US law will not run counter to any of the international agreements. 
For instance, the three step test of Berne is still fulfilled.78 Right holders will still be able to 
enforce their copyrights as a norm; the proposed test simply requires an adherence to the 
copyright balance when contracts are being used in relation to copyright works. For this reason, 
there should also be no issues of compliance raised in relation to TRIPS.79 
           Conclusions 
In the UK and at the EU level, there has been considerable lack of clarity in relation to the 
relationship between contracts and the copyright balance where a contractual clause extends or 
seeks to override existing copyright protection. This is particularly important in the online 
context where licensing of copyright works is increasingly common on a one-to-one basis. The 
traditional distinction between copyright as a right against the world, and a contract being an 
agreement between individuals, is breaking down. There is a need to restore the copyright 
balance where contracts between individuals contain clauses that extend copyright style 
protection. 
The “general subject matter” test within US law for such contracts is one way in which this 
pressing issue can be addressed within UK and EU level copyright law. It is a way to ensure that 
the copyright balance is applied to copyright works regulated by contracts. In the Pro CD case, 
Chief Justice Crabb makes a blunt statement about the relationship between copyright and 
contract specifically in relation to the plaintiff - “[the] plaintiff cannot [sic] use a standard form 
contract to make an end run [sic] around copyright law.”80 It might be said that this statement 
represents a bold assertion of copyright principles, but it is really reinforcing the pre-existing 
copyright balance and prevents right holders from contracting out of it. Existing right holders 
may not welcome the restriction of the their freedom of contract in terms of the distribution of 
copyright works, but it does mean that future authors will be able to have “balanced” access to 
the level that the state has decreed desirable under copyright law. C ontracts have principally 
been a way to exploit a work protected by copyright, rather than being the principal means of 
protection in place of copyright. In addition to the benefits introduced in relation to the 
balancing exercise, another benefit is that the law will provide a much clearer demarcation of 
the role of contracts.  
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Although the proposed test does help to restore the copyright balance, one of the issues that 
the proposed “general subject matter” test raises is its scope. An overly broad test could include 
many works within the scope of copyright balancing which otherwise would not be. However, 
this can be rectified by establishing a basic test that if a point of copyright law is arguable before 
the court, then the “general subject matter” test should be applied.  
The proposed test would therefore 
a) provide a clear rule which would establish where contracts need to adhere to the 
copyright balance; 
b) restore the copyright balance where new forms of distribution, based on new 
technologies,  utilise licensing; 
c) re-establish the role of contracts as being a means by which to exploit copyrights rather 
than becoming a replacement of copyright rules. 
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